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Abstract   
 
Russia-Georgia relations had been declining since Georgia first voiced its intention for NATO 
membership in 2005 which later escalated into a war in 2008. Despite being victorious in the 
2008 Russo-Georgian Five-Day War, the shortcomings of the Russian Armed Forces that were 
exposed during the war had led the country towards its “New Look” military reform 
announced months after the war. Many International Relations scholar draw a connection 
between the reform and Russia’s increasing assertiveness marked by the Crimean annexation 
and Russia’s involvement in Syria. This piece will then try to understand how Russian military 
performance in the 2008 war led to Russia’s most rigorous military reform, and more 
importantly, how did Russia implement its “New Look” reform during 2008 until 2013. Russia 
had underwent far reaching efforts and goals to transform the armed forces into combat-ready 
forces but had also faced challenges in modernizing its weaponry system, in increasing the 
quality and professionalism of its forces. 
Keywords: Russia; Georgia; New Look military reform; 2008 Russo-Georgian Five-Day 
War 
Abstrak  
 
Hubungan Rusia-Georgia telah menurun sejak Georgia pertama kali menyuarakan niatnya 
untuk menjadi anggota NATO pada tahun 2005 yang kemudian berujung dengan terjadinya 
perang pada tahun 2008. Meskipun menjadi pemenang dalam Perang Lima Hari antara Rusia 
dan Georgia 2008, kekurangan angkatan bersenjata Rusia yang terungkap selama perang telah 
membawa Rusia kepada reformasi militer "New Look" yang diumumkan beberapa bulan 
setelah berakhirnya perang. Banyak ahli Hubungan Internasional menguhubungkan koneksi 
antara reformasi dan meningkatnya ketegangan yang dibuat Rusia ditandai oleh aneksasi 
Krimea dan keterlibatan Rusia di Suriah. Karya ini kemudian akan mencoba memahami 
bagaimana kinerja militer Rusia dalam perang 2008 mengarah pada reformasi militer Rusia 
yang paling ketat, dan yang terlebih lagi, bagaimana Rusia menerapkan reformasi "New Look" 
dari 2008 hingga 2013. Rusia telah melakukan upaya dan tujuan yang luas untuk mengubah 
angkatan bersenjata menjadi pasukan yang siap tempur tetapi juga telah menghadapi tantangan 
dalam memodernisasi sistem persenjataannya, berkualitas, dan dalam meningkatkan kualitas 
dan profesionalisme  tentaranya. 
Kata Kunci: Russia, Georgia; reformasi militer New Look; Perang Lima Hari antara 
Rusia dan Georgia 2008; 
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Introduction 
After a series internal political 
turmoil, the year of 1991 marked the end of 
the so-called “Cold War” era as the Soviet 
Union collapses leading the world into a 
unipolar direction of United States global 
leadership. And from since, the former 
Soviet Union renamed Russian Federation 
has been struggling to grasp and gain more 
power to show its influence in the 
international arena marking its attempt to 
return its former glory as suggested by 
Gustav Gressel in his “Russia’s Quiet 
Military Revolution and What It Means for 
Europe” (2015: 2) that “The current 
Russian leadership has never accepted the 
post-1989 European order, including the 
norms, rules, and conventions agreed by the 
last generation of Soviet leadership.”  
Further, Russia also experienced 
waning geopolitical situation as Georgia 
and Ukraine expressed their intention to 
join NATO on early 2000s. In specific case 
of Russia and Georgia, their relationship 
was never in a good term since the very 
formation of Russian Federation; the 
Russian saw and blamed that Georgia had 
played a part in the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union empire (Asmus, 2010, p. viii). 
Their relationship is further 
convoluted with the issue in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia along with the accession of 
the newly elected “pro-American and 
European Union Oriented” Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakasvhili into office in 
2004 (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011, p. vii). 
And on 2008, the Russia-Georgia relations 
was at their worst state with the 2008 
Russo-Georgian Five-Day War episode 
which paved the way for Russia’s 2008 
“New Look” Reform. 
Despite being victorious in the war, 
the three previous military reforms are 
proven to be insufficient to satisfy Russia’s 
needs to achieve their political ends 
(Gayday, 2011; Gressel, 2015). The 
underperformed military during the five-
day war has made the then Defense 
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov decided to 
commence Russian Federation most radical 
military reform which then led to Russia’s 
increasing assertiveness in recent years 
marked by the 2014 Crimean annexation 
and its involvement on Syrian’s issue since 
2015 which surprised western analysts 
(Kofman, et al., 2017; Gressel, 2015). This 
article discusses the military reform from 
2008-2013. This reform was started in 2008 
when Russia entered the war with Georgia. 
The need for Russia to reform its military 
was to further elevate its capability to 
involve in a more modern war. 
 
 
 
 Page 185 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2019 
The 2008 Russo-Georgian Five-Day War 
 
The relationship between Russia 
and Georgia including the breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a 
convoluted string of relationship. Both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
internationally recognized parts of Georgia, 
but the series of separatist movements in the 
early years if its formation led to the 1992-
1993 Russia-sponsored agreements to put 
peacekeepers in South Ossetia consisting of 
equal number of peacekeepers from each 
party while in Abkhazia, the agreements 
made it possible for Russia to enjoy the role 
as the sole peacekeeping force (Cohen & 
Hamilton, 2011). 
 In August 2008, a war broke out 
between the Russian Federation and 
Georgia which lasted for five days from 7 
August until the conflicting parties reached 
a ceasefire agreement sponsored by the 
French government. While the Russian side 
justified their military operations as an act 
against Georgian aggression towards South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Georgian stood 
on their justification that their operation 
was to uphold constitutional integrity and 
sovereignty. 
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War 
played a significant role towards the 2008 
“New Look” reform, and this piece will 
then try to draw the connection between the 
2008 war with the creation of the 2008 
“New Look” reform using specific theories 
and concepts. Neoclassical Realism school 
of thought will be the main foundation in 
which the theory will justify Russia’s action 
to undergo military reform as a mean to 
achieve such objective in general sense. 
Gideon Rose (1998) described the school 
believes that a state’s place in International 
system regarding its relative material power 
capabilities primarily drives the scope and 
ambition of a state’s foreign policy. 
However, the influence of a state’s relative 
power capabilities in international system 
to the making of foreign policy is indirect 
in nature and complicated due to the 
pressure from systemic level that will  be 
translated through intervening variables at 
the unit level, such as: the decision makers’ 
perception and the strengths of a country’s 
state apparatus and its relation to the 
surrounding society.  
In more specific to this case, then, 
the concept of threat perception is used to 
determine the driving forces of the 
reformation as the intervening variable that 
affect the decision makers’ perception and 
will further used to describe the series of 
events happening in 2008. The threat 
perception is also utilized to explain 
Russia’s decision to wage war on Georgia 
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noting the waning geopolitical influence in 
the region as Georgia is making their way 
into NATO membership. At the same time, 
the authors believe that Russo-Georgian 
War also serves as an assessment for 
Russian military capabilities assessment 
that drives the decision for defense 
modernization, hence the “New Look” 
reform, The 2008 conflict has made Russia 
realize of the capabilities of its own military 
with negative critics coming from 
international community to strengthened 
the idea that defense modernization is 
needed (Adamsky, 2014; Gressel, 2015).  
The connection between theories 
and concepts are drawn as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The structure of the 
framework 
 
Russia’s Threat Perception for the 2008 
Russo-Georgian War 
Threat perception focuses on 
reacting to action by perceiving it as a threat 
in a form of policy and that threat 
perception can differ much from actor to 
actor based on each respective policy-
making process. Raymond Cohen (1978) 
suggests steps and countermeasures may be 
taken into effect as a result of a threat that 
has been perceived even when the 
opposition has no ill-intentioned actions 
towards the former. Raymond Cohen’s 
conceptualization of threat perception 
requires a state of “crisis” to which a threat 
then can be formulated through 
‘observation’ stage – which indications are 
received – and ‘appraisal’ stage – which 
these indications are evaluated and defined 
as threats. The observation stage involves 
“the selection of cues for attention from a 
universe of contemporary events” while the 
appraisal stage involves “the selection of 
explanations for these signals from a 
universe of possibilities” (p.95). 
The first cue observed was the 
moment when Georgia expressed their 
intention to join NATO in 2005 under 
President Mikheil Saakhasvhili and further 
irritate Russia by persistently negotiating 
for withdrawal of Russian military bases 
since 2004 and ended up with Russia 
withdrawing their troops and handover of 
an Armor Repair Plant. In February 14, 
2005, both NATO and Georgia signed an 
agreement on “the appointment of 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) liaison officer”, 
and the discussion between both parties 
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continued afterwards. Further, their 2005 
National Security Concept explicitly 
antagonize Russia as a “threat” to Georgia 
that may contribute to potential spillover of 
conflicts. 
Lack of control over the state 
border of Georgia with the Russian 
Federation along the perimeters of 
Abkhazia and the former 
Autonomous District of South 
Ossetia exacerbates the above-
mentioned threat [spillover of 
conflicts from neighboring 
countries] and creates further 
obstacles to deal efficiently with the 
problem. … In addition, the Russian 
Federation’s military presence on 
the territory of Georgia would be a 
risk factor to the stability of the 
country in certain circumstances. 
(Parliament of Georgia, National 
Security Concept, 2005). 
 
Raymond Cohen (1978) suggested 
that to appraise the degree of importance of 
such an observed event is to look in the 
argument put forward by observers to 
justify and to reason out the consequences 
of the threatening cue. Responding to 
NATO’s April 2-4, 2008 Bucharest Summit 
that concluded not to offer Georgia a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) but 
assured the Georgian side a special 
communique that they would grant 
membership once the requirements were 
met (NATO, 2008), Russian Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky 
said “Russia will take steps aimed at 
ensuring its interests along its borders, these 
will not only be military steps, but also 
steps of a different nature,” while Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said 
“Moscow will do everything it can to 
prevent the two countries [Georgia and 
Ukraine], run by pro-Western governments, 
from becoming NATO members.” 
(Shchedrov, Lowe, Brunnstrom, & 
Mchedlishvili, 2008).  
It is then clear that Moscow saw this 
issue as a serious matter that requires 
serious measures. On April 2008, the then-
President Vladimir Putin (succeeded by 
Dmitry Medvedev on May 7, 2008) after a 
meeting of Russia-NATO Council, while 
saying that the country’s relationship with 
NATO is improving, at the same time also 
emphasized that there are serious obstacles 
to the development of their relations 
(Kremlin, 2008). 
Threat perception may influence 
other state’s interest and may further affect 
approaches directed to other states. in the 
case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 
existence of threat perception perceived 
when Georgia express their effort for 
NATO membership and their decision to 
use force in South Ossetia influences the 
formation of Russia’s national interest in 
the form of their geopolitical goal which 
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consequently gave birth to the approach to 
reach the goals and deter the threats by the 
means of waging war with Georgia. 
President Dmitry Medvedev on August 11: 
On the night of August 7–8, Georgia 
committed an act of military 
aggression directed primarily 
against the people of South Ossetia 
and the Russian peacekeeping 
brigade deployed in this region. … 
Several thousand people have 
become victims of the ensuing 
humanitarian disaster, and a large 
number of them are our fellow 
citizens. … As I have said, my duty 
as President right from the outset 
was to protect our fellow citizens 
and not let the crimes committed 
against civilians and peacekeepers 
go unpunished. Russia wants to end 
this barbarity against the Ossetian 
people and against our citizens as 
soon as possible. (Kremlin, 2008) 
Further, during the Press Statement 
Following Negotiations with French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy (August 12, 
2008) and asked about whether there was 
any possibility for Russia to react different 
to Georgia’s aggression, President Dmitry 
Medvedev responded: 
If there had been any possibility for 
Russia to make a different response 
to Georgian aggression against 
South Ossetia we would have done 
so. There was no other option. 
Faced with the killing of several 
thousand citizens the state had to 
take the appropriate course of 
action. When international law is 
violated the state and the entire 
international community must take 
the appropriate action and not make 
the kind of half-hearted response 
that is regrettably common in the 
world today. (Kremlin, 2008) 
The relationship between the three 
variables is as illustrated in the figure 
below. 
Figure 2. The 2008 Russo-Georgia 
conflict triangle of threat perception 
 
 
Russia’s Goal in the 2008 Russo – Georgian 
War 
During their two years or more 
preparation for the 2008 operation, the 
Putin – Medvedev administration had come 
up with extensive list of interests that is 
translated into their geopolitical goals 
(Cohen & Hamilton, 2011, pp. 1-3). One of 
the goals was the expulsion of Georgian 
troops and effectively terminating Georgian 
sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
In his statement of recognition to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26th, 2008, 
President Dmitry Medvedev emphasized 
that: 
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• Georgia's NATO accession
• Georgia's Agression Towards 
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Tbilisi made its choice during the 
night of August 8, 2008. Saakashvili 
opted for genocide to accomplish 
his political objectives. By doing so 
he himself dashed all the hopes for 
the peaceful coexistence of 
Ossetians, Abkhazians, and 
Georgians in a single state. 
(Kremlin, 2008) 
Later in 2009, President Dmitry 
Medvedev gave a clear statement that: 
“Russia will never revoke its decision to 
recognize the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Kremlin, 2009). 
In addition, the goal was to also 
prevent Georgia’s membership to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
while also sending a strong message to 
other post-Soviet states, in particular; 
Ukraine regarding its persistence effort for 
NATO membership may lead to war. 
Vladimir Putin’s stressed that they “view 
the appearance of a powerful military bloc 
[NATO] on our borders, … as a direct 
threat to the security of our country” 
(Kremlin, 2008) and Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov stated that “Moscow will do 
everything it can to prevent the two 
countries [Georgia and Ukraine], run by 
pro-Western governments, from becoming 
NATO members.” (Shchedrov, Lowe, 
Brunnstrom, & Mchedlishvili, 2008). 
Further, Moscow was to also 
achieve their long-term strategic goal. 
Increasing control over the Caucasus and 
take control of strategic energy pipelines 
and transportation corridor that connect 
Central Asia and Azerbaijan with the Black 
Sea and ocean routes overseas for oil, gas, 
and other commodities. The war resulted in 
the temporary shutdown of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipeline 
and since, Azerbaijani oil company BP 
Azerbaijan had lost access to 1.6 kilometer 
section of the pipeline near South Ossetian 
Border (PwC, 2014; BBC, 2015) 
Due to an agreement established in 
1999 between Central Asian states and 
Western companies, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline thus created allowing 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
to bypass Russian-controlled pipeline and 
transport its oil straight through Georgia 
and Turkey. Being cautious of the potential 
output of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 
establishing a regime over Georgia would 
significantly limit sovereignty and 
diplomatic freedom of maneuver of these 
Central Asian states (Cohen & Hamilton, 
2011). 
Further, Cohen & Hamilton (2011) 
emphasized that by achieving these goals, 
the Russian Federation will be able to 
reassert their sphere of influence or “sphere 
of privileged interests” in the post-Soviet 
states and beyond, “if/when necessary by 
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use of force” (p.3). According to them, this 
will shape future post-Soviet states 
behavior to establish a friendlier tier of 
diplomacy with Moscow. 
The realization and awareness that 
the Russian armed forces is lacking combat 
capability and the emerging critics coming 
from within and outside Russia that revolve 
around Russia’s underperformed military 
during the five-days war become the 
necessary factors of the military reform 
noting that the Russian government realized 
that their forces at the state’s disposal were 
in no condition to fight in modern war 
(Cohen & Hamilton, 2011; Gressel, 2015). 
Thus, President Medvedev on 5 November 
2008 told its legislature that he had ordered 
a new “new configuration for our country’s 
armed forces,” and a rearmament effort 
because of military shortcomings that were 
exposed by the August 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict (Nichol, 2011). After the 
2008 Five-Day War, the government 
decided that scenarios involving large-scale 
attack against Russia are highly unlikely, 
instead, involvement in local conflicts in 
countries near Russian border is a more 
expected probability, thus, the 
abandonment of the “anachronistic” 
mobilization system of the Soviet Union 
(Gayday, 2011). 
On May 12, 2009, President Dmitry 
Medvedev announced the issuance of 
“National Security Strategy of Russia” 
(henceforth referred to as NSS) through the 
year of 2020. The document encompasses 
the principles which became the basis for 
Russia’s “Military Doctrine” and foreign 
policy (Nichol, 2011). And on February 5, 
2010, the President, in addition to the 
National Security Strategy, approved the 
new “Military Doctrine” which carries legal 
force as state policy an in principle dictates 
decisions on capabilities (Nichol, 2011). 
 
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 
2020 
According to President Medvedev, 
the National Security Strategy is a 
“fundamental, system-forming document, 
which is aimed at the enhancement of the 
quality of state control.” and serves as “an 
umbrella document for other policies 
prescribing Russian state approaches to 
strategic and strategic issues” (Giles, 2009). 
Giles (2009) emphasized that the document 
ensures a unified-strategic-goals is pursued 
collaboratively from every department and 
minimize instances in which department 
priorities dominating the development of 
the country. Further, the NSS is the 
“acknowledged system of strategic 
priorities, goals, and measures with regards 
to domestic and foreign policy that will 
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determine the degree of national security 
and the level of stable, long-term 
development of the state” (Section I, point 
3). 
The strategy states that 
globalization, characterize by increased 
“degree of dynamism and interdependence 
of events” has led nation-states to 
experience heightened conflicts of unequal 
development due to “deepening rift 
between rich and poor countries”. Further, 
the inadequacy of the current global and 
regional architecture “oriented towards 
NATO, and likewise the imperfect nature of 
legal instruments and mechanisms, create 
an ever-increasing threat to international 
security”. Among others, notable threats 
stated in the NSS include terrorism, 
proliferation of weapon of mass 
destruction, environmental issues, illicit 
development in the cybernetic an biological 
domains, existing international conflicts, 
new states possessing nuclear, economic 
crises, and the placement of Europe 
elements of the global missile defense 
system of the United States of America 
(Section II, point 8-12). 
Regarding National defense; 
Russia’s strategic goals related to 
improving national defense consist of 
“preventing global and regional wars and 
conflicts, and likewise of realizing strategic 
deterrence in the interests of ensuring the 
country's military security” and by ensuring 
military security  means “developing an 
improving the military organization an 
defensive potential of the state” and 
strategic deterrence is realized “by means 
of the development of a system of military-
patriotic education of Russian citizens, and 
likewise of military infrastructure and 
administration systems for the state military 
organizations.” 
The National Security Strategy also 
states that the main challenge of improving 
national defense in the medium term is “the 
transition towards a qualitatively new 
profile for the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation while maintaining the potential 
of the strategic nuclear forces”, referring to 
the New Look reform. Several key actions 
stated in this regard is to improve 
organizational staff structure and system, 
increasing the number of combat-ready 
units, thus, improving operations and 
combat training and the organization of 
interaction among different troops and 
forces. Further, the strategy also 
emphasized the need of a clearer 
recruitment system across the Armed 
Forces, other troops, military formations 
and bodies and the optimal standby 
mechanisms are being developed.  
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Russia’s Military Doctrine 2010 
Taking account of the Russian 
Federation National Security Strategy to 
2020 (Section I.2), the new Military 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation further 
evaluates in more specific, military dangers 
and military threats to the Russian 
Federation as well as the course of armed 
forces and other troops improvement. 
Under Section I point 8 regarding main 
external military dangers, the doctrine 
explicitly stating NATO as dangerous 
noting NATO’s effort of establishing 
military infrastructure near member 
countries close to the border of the Russian 
Federation and its continuous expansion. 
The section also includes the creation and 
deployment of strategic missile defense 
systems, militarization of outer space, the 
deployment of strategic nonnuclear 
precision weapon systems, and terrorism, 
among others as threats.  
Article 7 of the doctrine states that 
the likelihood of a large-scale war being 
wage against Russia has diminished, but 
there are growing threats of other natures; 
the likely scenario was participation in 
possible local countries of the former 
Soviet Union. Further, the doctrine also 
identifies the characteristic of the modern 
military conflicts under Section I point 13. 
Many scholars like Gressel (2015); 
Boltenkov et al. (2011); Nichol (2011); 
Barabanov et al. (2012); and Cohen & 
Hamilton (2011) argued that the 2008 
Russo – Georgian War significantly 
contributed to the Russia’s view of modern 
conflict and the issuance of this doctrine. In 
regards of technology, under point 15, the 
doctrine identifies types of technologies 
that will be utilized frequently and bear 
great significance for military actions while 
nuclear weapons will still serve as 
deterrence under point 16. And under 
section III point 17: 
The Russian Federation's military 
policy is aimed at preventing an 
arms race, deterring and preventing 
military conflicts, and improving 
military organization, the forms and 
methods of the utilization of the 
Armed Forces and other troops, and 
also means of attack for the purpose 
of defending and safeguarding the 
security of the Russian Federation 
and also the interests of its allies. 
(Section III, Military Policy of the 
Russian Federation, Russia’s 
Military Doctrine 2010) 
And to that end, some of the key 
points to be achieved in connection to the 
improvement and development of the 
Armed Forces were; to ensure permanent 
combat-readiness of the Armed Forces and 
other troops, to have fast mobilization and 
deployment of troops, to improve the 
administration, structure, composition, and 
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strength of the components of the military 
organization as well as to improve military 
training, education, technology and 
research, and personnel well-being, and to 
have up-to-date armament and equipment 
of the armed forces. 
The Implementations of the “New Look” 
Reform of The Russian Armed Forces 
2008 – 2013 
 
Prior to the “New Look” Reform, 
the Russian Armed Forces was mainly 
filled with conscripts and was designed for 
large scale air, land, naval war with massive 
mobilization of troops (Nichol, 2011). The 
Armed Forces maintained many skeleton-
level units with diverse obsolete equipment 
and weaponries. Further, the Armed Forces 
used a very long chain of command with 
slow and cumbersome mobilization system 
and disproportionate command and control 
personnel and officers (Boltenkov, Gayday, 
Karnaukhov, Lavrov, & Tseuluiko, 2011; 
Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). 
They had three previous reforms all aimed 
to transform the troops into combat-ready 
mobile forces manned mainly by 
professional soldiers, but were doomed to 
poor budget planning and weak economy 
(Gayday, 2011; Gressel, 2015). 
The NSS to 2020 and the 2010 Military 
Doctrine while also addressing national 
security and military issues, lays out the 
goals and the groundwork for the “New 
Look” reform. Thus, the goal of the 2008 
Military Reform was to transform the 
Russian Armed Forces into mobile and 
well-trained armed forces and equipped 
with modern equipment and weapons 
(Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). 
Notable changes were the introduction of 
the brigade system, reduction of the 
number, and the establishment of the new 
Joint Strategic Command – Military 
District. And to achieve such 
transformations, since 2008 the Ministry of 
Defense laid out five priorities as stated in 
the figure below. 
Figure 3. Priorities of the 2008 Reform 
 
(Source: Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012, p. 16) 
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Optimization of the Number of the 
Troops and Officers 
According to Barabanov et al. 
(2012) one of the most apparent indications 
of the “New Look” reform was to make the 
number of the armed forces including the 
officer corps slimmer as well as 
transforming the egg-shape military rank 
into a more pyramid-like. The reduction of 
the troops allows for a more cost-efficient 
armed forces and to transfer more budget to 
other area of focus. The officer corps was 
reduced from 335,000 – 365,000 in 2008 to 
220,000 by 2012. Warrant officers were 
abolished. And the number of reduced 
personnel as well as military ranks can be 
seen in the tables below. 
Table 1. Approximate number of 
Russian Federation military personnel 
throughout the year 
Year Number of personnel 
2008 1,200,000 
2009 1,027,000 
2010 1,027,000 
2011 1,046,000 
2012 956,000 
2013 820,000 
2014 910,000 
(Source: Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012; 
Persson, 2016; Fernandez-Osorio, 2016) 
 
Table 2. Number of Military Ranks in 
Russian Armed Forces by 2012 
Ranks 2008 2012 
Generals 1,107 610 
Colonels 25,665 7,700 
Majors 99,550 25,000 
Captains 90,411 42,000 
Senior Lieutenants, 
Lieutenants 
50,975 62,000 
(Source: Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012) 
 
Unified Strategic Commands 
Establishment 
To establish the idea of an 
integrated ground, naval, airborne, and air 
and defense command, the plan of creating 
Joint Strategic Commands (henceforth 
referred to as JSC) was proposed. The plan 
was to rearrange the existing six military 
districts into four military districts in which 
each corresponds to one JSC within the 
vicinity of the corresponding military 
districts. Under this model, service 
commands and combat-arm commands are 
transformed into combat-arm headquarters 
while preserving all the basic functions in 
organizational development, strength 
acquisition, and combat training 
(Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012).  
Reorganizing the Armed Forces 
Branches and Establishing the 
Aerospace Defense Forces 
 
The reform applied major reduction 
in the number of personnel across the armed 
forces as well as major restructuring of 
several branches of the armed forces and 
the reintroduction of conscripts into 
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service. The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) 
maintained their structure and while the 
branch experienced reductions at the 
command level, it got higher priority for 
procurements programs for modernizing 
technical equipment (Barabanov, 
Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). In addition to 
number reduction in the Navy, the Naval 
Aviation forces were converted into 
airbases with some units were transferred to 
the Air Force and a Joint Commands of the 
Submarine Forces had been established in 
the Northern Pacific Fleets. According to 
Boltenkov (2011), 2010 was the most 
successful for the Navy’s shipbuilding 
program in a decade with number of large 
ships entered service, many test and 
research program were undergoing and 
some proven fruitful, an several 
negotiations of agreements to procure new 
ships were successful. 
In the army, the reform transformed 
the army from division-based units into 
brigades by abolishing 203 divisions into 
85 brigades with 95-100 percent of 
compromised manning level on the basis of 
the available weapons and military 
equipment corresponding to 2,200 – 2,500 
servicemen at their full strength and was 
aiming to decrease the mobilization time 
from 24 hours into an hour (Barabanov, 
Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012; Gayday, 
2011). The Airborne Troops (henceforth 
referred to as VDV) retained their 
divisional designation and the conscripts 
were introduced back into VDV. The VDV 
aviation units were transferred to the Air 
Force and the surface-to-air missiles (SAM) 
regiments were established within the VDV 
unit formations to increase air defenses 
because the VDV relies heavily on air cover 
by Air Force and Air Defense and this 
weakness became apparent during the 2008 
war that the Airborne Troops could not 
managed to cope with Georgian UAVs 
(Lavrov, Reform of the Airborne Troops, 
2011). 
The main transformations in the Air 
Force were the restructure of the Air Force 
from regimental air army structure into air 
bases units. The air armies were replaced 
with four independent Air Force and Air 
Defense Commands, Long Range Aviation, 
and Military Transport Aviation. The 
airbases also include the previously 
independent airfield logistics, 
communications, and radar battalions 
making a single chain of command within 
the airbase. The current target across the 
Air Force is 100 flight hours to allow aerial 
refueling training for frontline aviation 
(Lavrov, Reform of the Russian Air Force, 
2011). The Aerospace Defense Force 
(ASD) was established to replace the Space 
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Force and to incorporate several 
components of the Air Defense from the Air 
Force (Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 
2012).  
The ASD forces were to be 
comprised of the Space Command and 
Missile Defense Command. The main idea 
behind the creation of this new forces 
according to Nichol (2011) was that the 
Russian leadership put heavy concerns of a 
US or NATO-led attack noting that Russia 
forecasted by 2020 the Western will have 
80,000 cruise missiles including 2,000 with 
nuclear capabilities (p.13). Consequently, a 
fast warning attack to the leadership in case 
of an initiation of an attack will be very 
crucial. The typical “New Look” units are 
shown in the table below (note that the table 
only show the “typical” configurations, the 
real configurations may vary based on the 
units). 
Reforming Military Education Systems 
The main concern in reforming the 
military education system was to have a 
greater centralization. The planning for 
2012 was to establish 10 “system-wide” 
schools which comprises of three military 
training and research centers, six military 
academies, and one military university. 
These new centers will be established on a 
territorial basis rather than on service 
principle and will comprise of the 
combination of the existing military schools 
and military institutions that existed in 2008 
(Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). 
With most of the armed forces filled with 
conscripts, and the one-year term of service 
introduced in 2007 further emphasized the 
need for advanced training and supervision 
by a professional corps of non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and 
remained a serious issue, thus the trainings 
were also focused on producing NCOs 
(Nichol, 2011). 
Conscription and Enlistment 
Since the establishment of the 2004-
2007 federal program, the focus of the 
military leadership and the defense ministry 
was to slowly replace conscripts with 
contract soldier, but the trend was reversed 
in 2008 – 2010 due to economic restraints 
of maintaining professional soldier. Further 
the federal program also failed to meet the 
target of having 400,000 professional 
soldiers with only about 190,000 
professional troops by early 2009 along 
with the diminishing quality of the 
contingent (Gayday, 2011; Nichol, 2011; 
Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). 
With further economic restrictions, contract 
soldiers in 2010 was down to 110,000, and 
the funding was being shifted to procure 
weapons and to boost the salaries of 
remaining contract soldiers (Nichol, 2011). 
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But later, in 2011 the trend reversed, 
by the end of that year, it was planned that 
eventually the armed forces will be filled 
with 220,000 officers, 425,000 contract 
soldiers, and 350,000 conscripts by 2017. It 
was assumed that the trend went back 
taking into account the low quality of 
conscripts and that the MoD was getting 
political supports. Steps to increase military 
prestige to attract more contract soldier 
were also taken place such as salary 
increase and provide housing benefits.  
Rearmament 
At the end of 2010 President 
Medvedev approved the latest State 
Armament Program (Gosudarstvennaya 
Programma Vooruzheniya, hereafter, 
GPV) for the years of 2011 to 2020. The 
program set out a very ambitious goal 
laying out the plan for weapon an 
equipment procurement, research and 
development and the creation of a new 
system with a budget of 20 trillion rubles 
(Cooper J. , 2016). The aim of the program 
was to drastically increase the share of 
modern armaments held by the armed 
forces from 15 percent in 2010 to 70 percent 
in 2020 (Cooper J. , 2016; Barabanov, 
Lavrov, & Tseluiko, 2010; Nichol, 2011). 
But Barabanov et al. (2012) and Cooper 
(2016) argued that the 70 percent “modern” 
armaments does not necessarily needs to be 
“modern”.  
Barabanov et al. (2012) and Cooper 
(2016) also agreed that the most weapon 
modernization procurement was heavily 
focused for the Ground Force and the Navy 
while the Air Force and got relatively 
strong renewal rate. Prior to the approval of 
the 2010 GPV massive procurement were 
also taken place for the Air Force. With the 
budget of 20 trillion rubles, the priority 
taken was to also establish the Aerospace 
Defense Forces and to improve the 
Strategic Rocket Forces, purchase of fifth-
generation fighter aircraft for the Air Force; 
ships and submarines for the Navy; and air-
defense systems. Nevertheless, the 
purchase of conventional weapons also 
starts off with high volume of purchases 
like command, control, communications, 
computer, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and 
increased mobility of troops (Barabanov, 
Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012; Nichol, 2011).  
The program also keeping the 
research and development budget at the 
very least 10 percent. The figure went to 20 
percent in 2011 and plummeted to 18 
percent in 2012 (Barabanov, Lavrov, & 
Tseluiko, 2010). Thus, to ensure smooth 
procurement agenda, several efforts to 
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make sure the yearly State Defense Order 
(hereafter, GOZ) run well were made such 
as disciplining the defense industry and 
provide full funding for several eligible 
contracts. 
According to Nichol (2011), the 
doctrine emphasized on the consolidating 
domestic weapon production, but domestic 
industries were deemed to be lacking the 
technology, thus the MoD decided to have 
several technologies imported to boost 
technology transfer and to create 
production series later. The decision creates 
arguments between the industries and the 
ministry, but the decision was also taken to 
increase the domestic defense industries 
competitiveness, price reduction and boost 
research and development. 
 
Challenges in the Implementation of the 
“New Look” Reform 2008 – 2013 
 
According to Nichol (2011), the 
reform faced several political hindrances. 
He explained that due to the course of the 
reform have been decided within a 
restricted circle of senior official, it 
damages military morale. Thus, the 
discontent was followed by high-profile 
resignations by generals and series of 
protests and demonstrations involving 
veterans in 2010 and 2011 which demanded 
Serdyukov resignation. Civilian had also 
conducted economically related 
demonstration and it is possible to recur on 
a larger scale. Several attempts to relieve 
the discontent according to Nichol (2011) 
were promises to increase officers’ salaries 
and pensions while also keeping defense 
budget as secretive as possible. Further 
there are also oppositions that still support 
to retain the mass mobilization army of the 
Soviet era. 
Further, Russia also faced economic 
challenges as adequate funding will be 
needed that will put burden on the relatively 
small and weak Russian economy 
(Barabanov, Lavrov, & Tseluiko, 2010). 
maintaining the budget under 4 percent of 
the GDP will be crucial as higher level of 
share will have detrimental effect on 
Russia’s economy. Further, Nichol (2011) 
explained that the extra funding coming 
from the reduction of troops and officers 
will not be felt in the near-term budgetary 
because the extra funding will be directed 
to pensions and mandated housing 
effectively reduce the availability to boost 
salaries thus contract soldier increasement 
hindered. Further, inflation in the price 
charged by defense industries continues to 
erode the value of increased procurement 
budgets and corruptions were reported 
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within the state defense order (GOZ). 
Eradicating corruption and inflation will be 
significant elements of the reform and have 
positive consequence for the overall 
economy (Nichol, 2011).  
Further, the failure of the 2010 GOZ 
also reflected the tension between the MoD 
and the defense industries mismanagement 
and inefficiency in the MoD and defense 
industries led to only 30 percent of weapons 
delivery in 2010 by defense industries 
(Nichol, 2011). The President handled the 
situation through firing or disciplining 
various MoD officials and defense 
industries heads. Thus, cooperation with 
defense industries will be very crucial. 
Russia is also facing demographical 
crisis to which the number of men that reach 
induction age was declining with Russia 
also facing “demographic valley” because 
of a sharp birth rate decline during the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
number is expected to plummet 
(Barabanov, Makienko, & Pukhov, 2012). 
It was assumed that approximately there 
will be 700,000 men with qualified age, but 
with deferments and exemptions the 
number fell to 550,000 while with the 
reduction of the term of service for 
conscripts to one year introduced in 2007, 
the number of conscripts needed increased 
substantially (Barabanov, Makienko, & 
Pukhov, 2012; Nichol, 2011).  
Conclusion 
The 2008 Military Reform rooted 
from the combination of waning 
geopolitical situation and deteriorating 
relationship with Georgia and other post-
Soviet states in 2005 along with the 
declining military capability of the Russian 
Armed Forces. The 2008 August Georgian 
aggression towards South Ossetia resulted 
in the involvement of the Russian Armed 
Forces in the conflicting area thus, the 
Russo–Georgian Five-Day War. But, the 
Russian military performance during the 
war received mixed reviews but for sure, 
the shortcomings of the Russian armed 
forces performance revealed during the war 
led to the announcement of the 2008 “New 
Look” Military Reform in the following 
months. 
The reform was aimed to transform 
the Russian Armed Forces from mass 
mobilization forces for large-scale war into 
permanent combat ready forces with high 
mobilization and equipped with modern 
weapon and equipment. The reform had 
planned far-reaching efforts and goals 
including, massive restructuring of the 
Armed Forces, substantial reduction on the 
number of the troops, the creation of new 
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military districts and Joint Strategic 
Command, reforming military education 
and training as well as the drafting system 
for officer, conscripts, and contract 
soldiers, along with extensive armament 
plan. But the reform was not a smooth ride 
along the road, the reform had faced 
challenges in carrying out the ambitious 
weapons modernization program, in 
conscripting enough quality troops, and in 
boosting the number of professional 
soldiers. But the reform has been successful 
in changing the old system into what they 
proclaimed to be fully staffed brigades 
along with establishing a more modern 
Joint Strategic Commands – Military 
Districts to support full integration of the 
Armed Forces element for operational 
purposes. Consequently, the effect of the 
reform can be seen from Russia’s Crimea 
annexation in 2014 and involvement in 
Syrian soil from 2015. 
References 
Books and chapters in books 
Asmus, R. D. (2010). A Little War That 
Shook the World. New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan. Retrieved 
from 
https://books.google.co.id/books?id
=1be8Y4yyGF4C&pg=PR3&sourc
e=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=o
nepage&q&f=false 
Austin, G., & Muraviev, A. D. (2000). The 
Armed Forces of Russia in Asia. 
London: I.B Tauris. 
Barabanov, M. S., Lavrov, A. V., & 
Tseluiko, V. A. (2010). the Tanks 
of August. Moscow: Centre for 
Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies. 
Boltenkov, D. (2011). Reform of the 
Russian Navy. In D. Boltenkov, A. 
Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. 
Lavrov, V. Tseluiko, & M. 
Barabanov (Ed.), Russia's New 
Army (pp. 81-102). Moscow: 
Centre for Analysis of Strategies 
and technologies. 
Boltenkov, D., Gayday, A., Karnaukhov, 
A., Lavrov, A., & Tseuluiko, V. 
(2011). Russia's New Army. (M. 
Barabanov, Ed.) Moscow: Centre 
for Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies. 
Cohen, A., & Hamilton, R. (2011). The 
Russian military and the Georgia 
war: lessons and implications. 
Strategic Studies Institute. 
 
 
 
 Page 201 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2019 
Gayday, A. (2011). Reform of the Russian 
Army. In D. Boltenkov, A. 
Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. 
Lavrov, V. Tseluiko, & M. 
Barabanov (Ed.), Russia's New 
Army (pp. 9-32). Moscow: Centre 
for Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies. 
Lavrov, A. (2010). Russian Air Losses in 
the Five Day War against Georgia. 
In M. S. Barabanov, A. V. Lavrov, 
& V. A. Tseluiko, the Tanks of 
August (pp. 99-106). Moscow: 
Centre for Analysis of Strategies 
and Technologies. 
Lavrov, A. (2010). Timeline of Russian-
Georgian Hostilities in August 
2008. In M. S. Barabanov, A. V. 
Lavrov, & V. A. Tseluiko, The 
Tanks of August (pp. 37-98). 
Moscow: Centre for Analysis of 
Strategies and Technologies. 
Lavrov, A. (2011). Reform of the Airborne 
Troops. In D. Boltenkov, A. 
Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. 
Lavrov, V. Tseluiko, & M. 
barabanov (Ed.), Russia's New 
Army (pp. 33-51). Moscow: Centre 
for Analysis and Technologies. 
Lavrov, A. (2011). Reform of the Russian 
Air Force. In D. Boltenkov, A. 
Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. 
Lavrov, V. Tseluiko, & M. 
Barabanov (Ed.), Russia's New 
Army (pp. 51-80). Moscow: Centre 
for Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies. 
Journals and online journals 
Arbatov, A. G. (1998). Military Reform in 
Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and 
Prospects. International Security, 
22(4), 83-134. 
doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.83 
Barabanov, M., Makienko, K., & Pukhov, 
R. (2012). Military Reform: 
Toward the New Look of the 
Russian Army. Moscow: Valdai 
Discussion Club. 
Bukkvoll, T. (2009). Russia's military 
performance in Georgia. Military 
Review, 57-62. 
Cohen, R. (1978). Threat Perception in 
International Crisis. Political 
Science Quarterly, 93(1), 93-107. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/214905
2?origin=JSTOR-pdf 
Fernandez-Osorio, A. E. (2016). 2008 
Russian military reform: An 
 
 
 
 Page 202 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2019 
adequate response to global threats 
and challenges of the twenty-first 
century? Revista Científica 
General José María Córdova, 41-
82. 
Gustav Gressel. (2015). RUSSIA’S QUIET 
MILITARY REVOLUTION, AND 
WHAT IT MEANS FOR EUROPE. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS. 
Lavrov, A. (2018). Russian Military 
Reforms from Georgia to Syria. 
Center for Strategic & International 
Studies (CSIS). Retrieved 
November 20, 2018, from 
https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/181106_RussiaS
yria_WEB_v2.pdf?sM_hVtQ0qs4_
TTU9rSTS_sDJJvcB.IPg 
Official Publications, reports, and online 
sources 
Cooper, J. (2016). Russia’s state 
armament programme to 2020: a 
quantitative assessment of 
implementation 2011–2015. 
Swedish Defence Research 
Agency. 
Cordesman, A. H., & Kleiber, M Giles, K. 
(2009, June). Russia's National 
Security Strategy to 2020. NATO 
Defense College. Retrieved from 
ResearchGate. 
Gorenburg, D. (2017, November). 
Russia’s Military Modernization 
Plans: 2018-2027. Retrieved 
November 6, 2018, from Program 
on New Approaches to Research 
and Security in Eurasia (PONARS 
Eurasia): 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/mem
o/russias-military-modernization-
plans-2018-2027 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
(2006). The Military Balance 2006. 
International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
(2018). The Military Balance 2018. 
International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies. (2009, May 14). Russia 
Strategic Rocket Forces Overview. 
Retrieved March 13, 2019, from 
Nuclear Threat Initative: 
https://www.nti.org/analysis/article
s/russia-strategic-rocket-forces-
overview/ 
 
 
 
 Page 203 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2019 
Kofman, M., Migacheva, K., Nichiporuk, 
B., Radin, A., Tkacheva, O., & 
Oberholtzer, J. (2017). Lessons 
from Russia's Operations in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 
Retrieved November 20, 2018, 
from 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/researc
h_reports/RR1498.html 
Kremlin. (2008, August 25). Beginning of 
Meeting with Russian Permanent 
Envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) Dmitry 
Rogozin. Retrieved from President 
of Russia: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/transcripts/48296 
Kremlin. (2008, August 25). Dmitry 
Medvedev met with Russian 
Permanent Envoy to NATO Dmitry 
Rogozin. Retrieved from President 
of Russia: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/news/1208 
Kremlin. (2008, April 4). Press Statement 
and Answers to Journalists’ 
Questions Following a Meeting of 
the Russia-NATO Council. 
Retrieved from President of Russi: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/transcripts/24903 
Kremlin. (2008, August 26). Statement by 
President of Russia Dmitry 
Medvedev. Retrieved from 
President of Russia: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/transcripts/1222 
Kremlin. (2009, August 8). Russia will 
never revoke its decision to 
recognise the independence of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Retrieved from President of 
Russia: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/news/45330 
Kremlin. (2014, April 17). Direct Line 
with Vladimir Putin. Retrieved 
from President of Russia: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/presiden
t/news/20796 
Kremlin. (2017). Расширенное заседание 
коллегии Министерства 
обороны. Retrieved from 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/n
ews/56472 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation and Georgia. (2005). 
JOINT STATEMENT. Retreived 
from The Ministry of Foreign 
 
 
 
 Page 204 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN”Veteran” Jakarta 
 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.2 No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2019 
Affairs of the Russian Federation: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_poli
cy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/c
ontent/id/437172 
NATO. (2008, April 3). Bucharest Summit 
Declaration. Bucharest Summit. 
Bucharest: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Retrieved from 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization: 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoliv
e/official_texts_8443.htm 
The Government of Georgia. (2005). 
National Security Concept of 
Georgia.  
The Government of the Russian 
Federation. (2009). National 
Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation to 2020.  
The Government of the Russian 
Federation. (2010). The Military 
Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation.  
Nichol, J. (2008). Russia-Georgia Conflict 
in South Ossetia: Context and 
Implications for US Interests. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
WASHINGTON DC 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE. 
Nichol, J. (2011). Russian Military Reform 
and Defense Policy. Congressional 
Research Service. 
Persson, G. (Ed.). (2016). Russian Military 
Capability in a Ten-Year 
Perspective. Swedish Defense 
Research Agency. 
 
